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In March 2003, the Southern Common
Market (Mercosur) celebrated its twelfth
anniversary. In twelve years, the bloc
went from a substantially restricted trade
structure to a practically free-trade area,
with additional efforts in establishing a
customs union and progressing toward a
common market. Despite these advances,
the integration process has experienced
setbacks as the result of such different
economic phenomena as the Asian
financial crisis, Brazil’s currency
devaluation and, later, economic
uncertainty in Argentina. Setbacks to the
integration process create credibility
issues and could jeopardize the future of
the process. This paper discusses the
current level of economic integration of
Mercosur, the speed of the process, and
the resulting mixed level of different
stages of economic integration. It also
discusses the main achievements in the
last twelve years, identifies the
shortcomings as well as the opportunities
and challenges facing the bloc
in the near future.
Resumo
Em março de 2003, o Mercado Comum do Sul
(Mercosul) celebrou seu décimo segundo aniversário.
Emdozeanos,oblocopassoudeumarranjocomerci-
al bastante restrito para, praticamente, uma área de
livre comércio, com esforços adicionais no sentido do
estabelecimento de uma união alfandegária e da pro-
gressão em direção a um mercado comum. Apesar
destes avanços, o processo de integração sofreu retro-
cessos em função de diferentes fenômenos econômicos,
como a crise financeira asiática, a desvalorização da
moedabrasileirae,posteriormente,aincertezaeconô-
mica na Argentina. Os retrocessos para o processo de
integração criam problemas de credibilidade e poderi-
am ameaçar o seu futuro. Este artigo discute o nível
atual de integração econômica do Mercosul, a veloci-
dade com que este processo ocorreu, assim como os di-
ferentes estágios de integração econômica que coexis-
tem atualmente como resultado da rapidez deste pro-
cesso. Discute também as principais realizações nos
últimos doze anos, identificando os problemas bem
como as oportunidades e desafios que o bloco tem










Classificação JEL F02, F13,
F15.1_ Introduction
In March 2003, the Southern Common
Market (Mercosur) celebrated the
twelfth anniversary of the signature of
the Treaty of Asunción, which laid the
foundations for the economic
integration between Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay.1 In these twelve
years, the trading bloc was
tremendously successful in reducing
tariff and nontariff barriers and
increasing intrabloc trade up to 1998.2
Additionally, the group as a whole has
reduced tariffs and nontariff barriers to
trade with countries outside Mercosur
and has moved in the direction of a
customs union thanks to the
negotiation and implementation of a
large percentage of common
external tariffs.
Despite these advances, the
integration process has experienced
setbacks as many integration processes
before it. At a more global level,
reviewing the historical lessons of
previous global economic integration
waves, James (2001) outlines three
interpretations – self-destruction,
backlash, and weaknesses in
institutional regulations – related to the
end of those globalization processes.3
He defends the idea that resentments
against the three major components of
globalization (capital flows, trade, and
international migration) were among the
major reasons (protectionism,
nationalism etc., largely rejecting the
principles of globalism) that resulted in
the Great Depression. He raises the
question whether the failure (and riots
as well) of the World Trade
Organization ministerial meetings in
Seattle in November 1999 set the tune
for the new century and concludes that
at present there is the beginning of an
antiglobalist coalition, based on hostility to
immigration (because of concerns about the
labor market), a belief in capital controls
(in order to prevent shocks emanating from
the financial sectors), and skepticism about
global trade. (James, 2001, p. 223).
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1 Chile and Bolivia are
associate members of Mercosur.
They belong to the free-trade
area but they are neither
members of the customs union
nor the common market.
2 The intrabloc trade jumped
from 9 percent of total exports
in 1990 to a quarter of the
group’s total exports eight years
later but declined substantially
after the Asian crises, the
Brazilian currency devaluation
and, more recently, the
Argentinean crisis. Preliminary
data for 2002 and 2003 show
some improvement in the
intrabloc trade.
3 As the title of his paper
indicates, “The End of
Globalization, Lessons from
the Great Depression”, he gives
special emphasis on the great
globalization wave of the end of
the nineteenth century that
culminated with the Great
Depression, heavy
protectionism, and nationalism
of the interwar period.He argues that these
manifestations have produced neither a
coherent “intellectual cement” against
globalization nor a specific model of
national success, and the absence of
these two features
explains why the pendulum is so slow in
swinging back from globality. But it
does not and cannot explain why it will
not swing.
Not differently from the more
global trends discussed by Harold James,
the integration process of Mercosur has
experienced setbacks as the result of such
different economic phenomena as the
Asian financial crisis, Brazil’s devaluation
of its currency and, later, economic
uncertainty in Argentina. Setbacks to the
integration process create credibility issues
and could jeopardize the future of the
process. Additionally, it is not clear what
consequences the global trends discussed
by James (recent breaking down of the
World Trade Organization talks in
Cancun and the difficulties associated
with the negotiation of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas – FTAA) will have
on Mercosur as member countries may be
tempted to negotiate bilateral agreements
with other countries or move further into
negotiations as a cohesive bloc. In this
paper, we discuss some of these issues.
The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 discusses the current
level of economic integration of
Mercosur, focusing on how the
development strategy shifts from import
substitution to more open
economies in the 1980s, influenced the
speed of the process and resulted in a
mixed level of different stages of
economic integration. In Section 3, we
discuss the main successful achievements
in the last twelve years, while Section 4
identifies the shortcomings. Section 5,
deals with the opportunities and
challenges facing the bloc in the near
future and, in Section 6, some tentative
conclusions are drawn.
2_ Mercosur: partners of all sizes
The four full members and two
associate members of Mercosur
represent 67% of Latin America’s land
area, 47% of its population, and more
than half of its gross domestic product.
Although these are impressive numbers,
they hide substantial differences among
Mercosur members. For example,
although the bloc represents two thirds
of Latin America’s total area, Brazil
alone accounts for over 40 percent of
the entire region, while Uruguay
represents less than one percent.
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percent and 38 percent of the region’s
GDP in 1998 and 2001, respectively,
compared with less than one half of one
percent by Paraguay in both years. In
other words, there are various and
significant differences between member
c o u n t r i e s ,a ss h o w ni nT a b l e1 .
3_ Mercosur: free trade area?
Customs union? Common market?
The economic integration process of
Mercosur combined elements of different
stages of trade liberalization in a short
period of time. In twelve years, the bloc
went from a substantially restricted trade
structure to a practically free trade area,
with additional efforts in establishing a
customs union and progressing toward a
common market. This more aggressive
process of economic integration was part
of an economic development strategy
based on three major pillars: a less
interventionist state, a more open
economy, and democratic systems
of government.
It is important to note that Latin
America in general, and Mercosur
members in particular, embarked on
economic integration into the world
economy (as well as more effective
intraregional integration) only recently,
specifically in the last two decades. Before
this change in development approach,
most Latin America countries adopted a
more closed-economy development
strategy, known as “industrialization via
import substitution.”
3.1_ The import-substitution model
Under the “industrialization via import
substitution” model, the state played a key
role as the main investor in the economy
and as the conductor of the whole
development process. As such, sectors
and products, which were thought to be
strategically important for the country’s
economic development, enjoyed generous
subsidies and strong protection against
foreign competition. This growth strategy
resulted in inefficient and noncompetitive
economies insulated from world markets.
Prices of protected sectors and products
reflected neither international market
prices nor changes in domestic demand.
The population in general bore the costs
of production inefficiencies, as firms
exercised their market power, or through
higher inflation. Also, the population bore
the costs of subsidies through
government spending, although the lack
of transparency kept them from being
explicitly shown in fiscal budgets.
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between 1950 and 1980, the “import
substitution” strategy yielded
economic growth rates for Latin
America that were above international
averages. Unfortunately, this strategy
also resulted in a low level of
participation in overall world trade
and strong dependence on public
(domestic) and foreign (private)
investments.
The import substitution model
was unsustainable and ultimately led
to a widespread economic crisis in the
1980s, with growing budget and trade
deficits, accelerating rates of inflation,
and recession. Many Latin American
countries experienced the worst of
two worlds, economic recession and
high rates of inflation. At the same
time, the world economy was moving
towards higher levels of economic
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Table 1_ Land, population, and GDP by Country












%o fL a t A m
Argentina 2.780.400 13,50 37.032 7,30 281.450,20 14,78 257.723,50 12,94
Brazil 8.511.965 41,40 170.693 33,60 703.647,60 36,96 749.505,70 37,64
Paraguay 406.752 2,00 5.496 1,10 8.594,00 0,45 8.737,00 0,44
Uruguay 177.414 0,90 3.337 0,70 20.517,70 1,08 18.780,20 0,94
Bolivia 1.098.581 5,30 8.329 1,60 7.727,00 0,41 8.036,00 0,40
Chile 756.626 3,70 15.211 3,00 84.953,20 4,46 90.622,20 4,55
Mercosur 13.731.738 66,80 240.098 47,30 1.106.890,00 58,14 1.133.405,00 56,91
Rest of Latin
America
6.814.350 33,20 267.832 52,70 796.849,20 41,86 858.090,70 43,09
Latin America 20.546.088 100,00 507.930 100,00 1.903.740,00 100,00 1.991.496,00 100,00
Note: (1) Data from the Anuario Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe 2002, CEPAL.integration, with increasing
cross-countries flows of capital, trade,
and labor (migration). This process
has become known as globalization.
3.2_ Recent changes in economic
development strategy
Latin America underwent a radical
change in the last two decades as a
response to the crisis triggered by the
end of the import substitution
strategy and also as a response to the
changes in the international economic
environment, namely economic
globalization. Recent transformations
have included a sea change in the
state’s role in the economy, aimed at
achieving fiscal equilibrium and
increasing public-sector efficiency.
A major component in reforming the
state was a comprehensive program
of privatization of state-owned
enterprises that had accumulated over
previous decades. The privatization
program was designed to increase
overall efficiency levels of the
economy, where the state remains the
primary supplier of public goods but
exercises a smaller role in productive
activities. Economic policy in Latin
America adopted the main ideas of
the so-called “Washington
Consensus”, seeking a
market-oriented economy with less
state intervention, pursuing fiscal
austerity, and realistic monetary and
exchange rate policies, consistent with
a more competitive economy. The
private sector became a major agent
to capture private savings and invest
them in the productive sector.
A second major component of
the recent economic transformations in
Latin America was the liberalization of
trade and capital accounts. On the one
hand, the region sought to open new
m a r k e t sf o ri t sp r o d u c t sa n d ,o nt h e
other hand, it also experienced keener
competition from foreign producers in
local markets.
The taxonomy of economic
integration suggests a hierarchy of
liberalization of markets and
coordination of policies, which would
take countries from a position of an
autarky to a monetary union. In general
terms, this taxonomy could be
summarized as follows:
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expected to follow the taxonomy
described above in the exact order
indicated, it is likely that economic
integration might follow some sort of a
“natural” path from lower to higher
levels of integration. It is difficult to
a r g u ef o rac u s t o m su n i o nw h e n
members have not yet freed trade
among themselves. The European
Union is a good example of a long and
gradual process of economic
integration, although this group has
faced and continues to face many
barriers to full implementation.
As latecomers to the game,
Mercosur members speeded up their
economic integration process in an
attempt to catch up with the rest of the
world. Accordingly, the bloc currently
has characteristics of a free trade area, a
customs union, and some advances
toward a common market, but none of
these stages are completely
consolidated.4 Some of these
characteristics are as follows:
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Economic isolation, no trade at all,
consumption restricted to domestic
production.
X
Trade takes place, but with the presence
of tariff and non-tariff barriers.
X
Zero tariff structure for goods and services
between members with reduced or eliminated
non-tariff barriers to trade.
XXX X
Common external tariff structure. X X X
Free mobility of labor and capital across
member countries.
XX
Only one currency. Countries share a central
bank, no individual monetary policy.
X
4 For example, in April 2001,
Domingos Cavallo, then the
Argentinean Finance Minister,
increased tariffs on imported
consumer goods to an average
of 35% and unilaterally
decreased tariffs on imported
capital goods to zero,
departing from the bloc’s
common external tariffs.
These actions are supposed to
be temporary.Free trade area
_most tariffs on goods were
eliminated by 1995, although
exceptions for some sensitive
goods are still present.
Customs union
_ common external tariff structure
introduced in 1995. Capital goods
and many electronic goods were
not included in the common
external tariff schedule (for some
goods and some countries, it is
expected to converge by 2006);
_a common antidumping
legislation has been developed
and is being evaluated.
Common market
_labor mobility is quite restricted;
_the Protocol of Montevideo –
phased out restrictions on trade
in services (10 years) and faster
for financial services, air
transportation, satellite
communications, insurance, and
professional services (all under
negotiation);
_ 1998 – a memorandum of
understanding called for mutual
recognition of university
diplomas – full implementation
would allow university graduates
to work in any member country
(including Bolivia and Chile) . It
will require a common standard
to evaluate the quality of
universities;
_in 1999, Brazil and Argentina
established groups to study the
coordination of macro policies
– harmonize statistical data and
methodology of economic
indicators;
_a “small Maastricht Treaty” has
been thought in order to
establish fiscal balance among
members. Fiscal responsibility
laws in Brazil and Argentina.5
4_ Successful outcomes
The process of trade liberalization among
Mercosur members has been successful
on many fronts, from increased trade
flows and cross-country investments to
consolidation of democratic regimes.
Some of these achievements are
highlighted in this section.
4.1_ Increased intraregional trade
and investment flows
Economic integration brought an
impressive surge in intrabloc trade
flows, an increase of close to fivefold
between 1990 and 1998. As shown in
Table 2, intragroup exports (only the
four full members) jumped from less
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5 Fiscal responsibility laws are
in the agenda of the new
government in Paraguay.than 9 percent of the bloc’s total
exports in 1990 to 25 percent in 1998.
From 1999 to 2002, due to the
contagion effect of the Asian crisis in
1998 and subsequent Brazilian
devaluation of the real and, more
recently, the crises in Argentina, the
intrabloc share of total exports declined
substantially to a low 11.3% in 2001.
The jump in the share of total exports
for the 1990-1998 period was the result
of a much higher growth rate in
intrabloc exports compared with
exports outside the bloc. From 1990 to
1998, total exports increased by 75%
representing a growth of 44% for
exports to countries outside Mercosur
and an astonishing rate of almost 400%
growth for intrabloc exports. However,
this trend slowed dramatically and, for
the 1990-2001 period, total exports
increased by 82% with a 77% increase
in exports to countries outside
Mercosur and a 131% increase in
exports within Mercosur. The years
2001 and 2002 are likely to represent
the bottom of this trend and
preliminary data show that conditions
were improving in the first half of 2003.
For example, intrabloc exports
i n c r e a s e db ym o r et h a n1 5 %i nt h ef i r s t
half of 2003 compared to the same
period in 2002.
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Table 2_ Exports within and outside Mercosur – 1990-2000 US$ millions
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total 46,402 45,891 50,463 54,122 62,113 70,402 74,998 82,342 81,323 74,320 84,659 84,279
% growth -0.3 -1.1 10.0 7.3 14.8 13.3 6.5 9.8 -1.2 -8.6 13.9 -0.4
Outside
Mercosur
42,275 40,788 43,246 44,095 50,157 56,019 57,960 62,289 60,972 59,158 66,961 74,742
% growth -1.0 -3.5 6.0 2.0 13.7 11.7 3.5 7.5 -2.1 -3.0 13.2 11.6
Within
Mercosur
4,127 5,103 7,216 10,026 11,957 14,384 17,038 20,053 20,351 15,163 17,698 9,537
% growth 7.6 23.6 41.4 38.9 19.3 20.3 18.5 17.7 1.5 -25.5 16.7 -46.1
Intra/Total 8,9 11,1 14,3 18,5 19,3 20,4 22,7 24,4 25,0 20,4 20,9 11,3
Source: IDB Periodic Note on Integration and Trade in the Americas, December 2002.A very important point to make
here is that, although intrabloc trade flows
increased substantially since Mercosur
came into existence, the evidence suggests
that the preferential regional agreement
did not result in a large trade diversion as
one might have expected. As shown in
Chart 1, total imports by Mercosur
members increased proportionally more
than total exports and, more importantly,
imports from countries outside the bloc
grew strongly as well. The process of
regional trade liberalization took place in a
context of overall trade liberalization
(open regionalism), which reduced the
likelihood of trade diversion.
The unilateral trade liberalization
registered in the past decades was part of
the overall opening of the region’s
economies and the new economic
development strategy. For example, as
Devlin and Ffrench-Davis (1998) observe
the average tariff for Latin America and
Caribbean has declined from 45 percent in
the second half of the 1980s to 13 percent
in 1995, accompanied by a sharp
reduction of tariff dispersion as well.
Furthermore, over the same period the
share of the region’s imports subject to
non-tariff barriers declined from 31 percent
to 11 percent.
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Extra-Mercosur Exports Intra-Mercosur Exports (same as imports) Extra-Mercosur Imports
Chart 1_ Extra and intra Mercosur trade flows
Source: CEPAL – Anuario estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe, various issues.Additionally, there was an
increase in intraregional investment
flows. Bonelli (2001) argues that
one of the most important consequences
of Mercosur integration was the
increase in the levels of direct foreign
investment (DFI) in the region,
particularly between Argentinean
and Brazilian firms.
He adds that recent studies
(before the change in the Brazilian
exchange rate regime) show that
the DFI flows between the two countries
increased by the end of the decade
compared to the rest of the 1990s,
and that
the increases in DFI are substantially
higher than the increase in trade flows
between the two countries.
4.2_ A common external tariff structure
Since 1995, Mercosur members have
established a quasi-customs union with
a common external tariff (CET)
covering around 85% of imports. The
CET includes twelve tariff levels,
ranging from 0 to 23%, and represents
a real decrease in overall tariffs with the
rest of the world. It was also established
that, for most exceptions, the countries
would continue to use their own tariffs
but would converge to a common
external tariff by 2001; for a few other
exceptions, convergence would come
later. For example, the CET for capital
goods would be 14% starting in 2001,
and for computer-related goods it
would be 16% starting in 2006.
4.3_ Harmonization
of macroeconomic policy
The process of harmonizing
macroeconomic policy is a necessary
condition, although not sufficient, to
establish a common market and to
consolidate the integration process. In
addition to the steps towards
harmonizing economic statistics, the
December 2000 meeting of ministers of
economic affairs and presidents of
central banks of the full and associate
member countries of Mercosur
established concrete common
macroeconomic targets for the near
future. For instance, they agreed on a
maximum inflation target of 5% for the
period 2002-2005, and starting, in 2002,
a budget deficit of no more than 3% of
GDP and a suggested ratio of public
debt to GDP of no more than 40%.
Moreover, both Brazil and Argentina
have passed fiscal responsibility
l e g i s l a t i o ni na na t t e m p tt or e s t r a i n
fiscal deficits.
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of the democratic process
The consolidation of democracy among
Mercosur’s members is one of the most
important achievements of the
economic integration process. In the
1998 Ushuaia Protocol, member
countries agreed that democracy was an
essential condition of the integration
process among them. Furthermore,
they established procedures to follow in
case of a rupture of the democratic
order in any member country. At the
same meeting, they declared Mercosur,
Bolivia, and Chile as a “peace zone,”
free of arms of mass destruction.
The commitment to a democratic
regime was confirmed with the
declaration of June 1999, when the
presidents of the member countries
repudiated violence as a resource of
political action as occurred in Paraguay
in March 1999. They also confirmed
their support to the democratic system
in Paraguay and to the process of
normalizing and strengthening the
country’s institutions.
4.5_ Negotiating bloc
One other important gain has been the
increased bargaining power that the
Mercosur countries acquired as a bloc
to negotiate trade agreements with
other countries. Good examples of such
gains are the “Four plus One” talks
with the United States, the talks with
the EU and the discussions on the Free
T r a d eA r e ao ft h eA m e r i c a s( F T A A ) .I n
other words, the Mercosur has a
political dimension which transcends
the commercial dimension. Currently,
t h eM e r c o s u rc a nb eav e r yi m p o r t a n t
tool for Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and
Uruguay to negotiate their insertion as
well as to create a path for the insertion
of Latin America within the realm of
the FTAA, EU, and WTO. In one of
the last Mercosur summits, the
presidents of the member countries
have decided to negotiate with the EU
and FTAA as a single bloc. This shows
that, despite the transitory difficulties,
which can harm trade relations within
the bloc, political relations are deeper
and more stable.
5_ Shortcomings
The shortcomings of the integration
process are, to a certain degree, related
to the general background within which
the scheme took place. For example,
Mercosur came into existence within a
broader liberalization project, when the
economies of member countries were
being opened unilaterally to the rest of
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four member countries engaged in a
deeper, fast and ambitious integration
process among themselves. As
mentioned before, this process evolved
rapidly and steps to higher levels of
integration were taken without strong
consolidation of previously negotiated
lower levels of integration.
Another important fact to note is
that the integration process was
launched and developed while these
countries were conducting
macroeconomic stabilization plans.
However, the timing of these plans was
not synchronized and, as such, created
additional difficulties for the
liberalization process. At the same time,
changes in international financial
markets and the exposure of the
region’s economy to those markets
increased the vulnerability of Mercosur
economies to external shocks. This
period was, moreover, characterized by
current account deficits resulting in a
dependence on the foreign financing of
the balance of payments. These
increasing difficulties have resulted in
setbacks in the liberalization process
due to internal or external economic
problems, harming the credibility of the
integration scheme. The member
countries have unilaterally changed
tariff levels and nontariff barriers too
many times, creating a poor
environment to consolidate gains and
walk toward higher levels of integration.
The lack of a more formal
mechanism for settling disputes and
dealing with trade flow imbalances
contributes to these occasional setbacks
as decisions continue to depend on
“diplomatic/political” actions, and
costs of setbacks are not known ex ante.
The question of how to avoid these




There are many factors that increase the
probability of member countries to reach
a situation where setbacks to an economic
integration process are likely to occur. For
example, countries with more open
economies are less likely to give in to
short-term pressures, since the cost of
setbacks is higher due both to large
distortions on the import side and, if
retaliated, to larger losses on the export
side. Another factor is the level of
synchronization of the member countries’
economies. If their economies are in sync,
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likely to require similar policy responses
that could be negotiated among member
countries without the need for unilateral
changes in tariff and nontariff
instruments. However, in the absence of
strong harmonization of macroeconomic
policies, it is very difficult to coordinate
policy responses to external shocks.
There are many occasions – such
as the recent Asian crisis, the Brazilian
devaluation, and the Argentinean
economic downturn – when countries,
which are part of a small preferential trade
agreement, feel tempted to restrict trade
temporarily, creating an environment
where trade sanctions flourish and further
economic integration is strongly
jeopardized. The main reason for such
behavior is that there is some type of a
trade-off between short-term and
long-term policy options. In the short run,
governments have a tendency to raise
tariff and nontariff barriers to trade when
faced with a balance-of-payments
problem. For example, in 1997, Brazil and
Argentina increased common external
t a r i f f sb y3 % ,w h i l eP a r a g u a ya n d
Uruguay applied them more selectively.
Brazil increased import duties on several
products in 1998 and also raised nontariff
barriers such as licenses. More recently,
Argentina unilaterally increased tariffs on
imports of consumer goods and, at the
same time, abolished tariffs on imports of
capital and intermediate goods.
Temporary setbacks in the
process of economic integration create
tension between members and can
damage the long-term credibility of the
integration scheme and, if they persist,
can threaten its very survival. Thus, the
lost of credibility is maybe the worst
problem member countries can
encounter in their economic integration
process. Iglesias (2000) suggests that
“launching an integration initiative is easier
than sustaining it.” Talking about
integration initiatives prior to the 1990s,
he recalls that
while not without their achievements,
none of the early initiatives fully realized
their ambitious objectives,
and adds that
indeed, all these early post-war
agreements lost momentum during the
late 1970s and fell into open crisis in
the 1980s.
As discussed above, when
governments face external (or internal)
economic problems resulting in relatively
large trade deficits, they generally also face
pressures to raise tariff and nontariff
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increase exports. They must decide
whether short-run political gains of raising
tariff and nontariff barriers are larger than
long-run economic losses.6
Under the circumstances and
frequent pressures discussed above, the
question is how to preserve credibility
in the presence of a crisis and how to
reduce the likelihood of setbacks which
hurts the credibility of the integration
process. Among others, there are four
important actions which could help to
achieve these goals.
7_ Escape clauses:
flexibility within the agreement
Most free-trade areas have detailed
escape clauses that allow member
c o u n t r i e st od e a lw i t hs u r g e si ni m p o r t s
or other temporary economic problems
without violating the agreement.
Although Mercosur has a common
escape-clause structure to deal with
extrabloc trade, there are no such
clauses to address intrabloc trade
unbalances.
Some scholars argue that the
flexibility of the Mercosur agreement,
the lack of a large bureaucracy, formal
safeguards, and escape clauses helped
the free-trade zone to flourish in its first
years of existence (Baumann, 2001).
There is merit in this argument as the
success of Mercosur in the last ten years
suggests that, at least in that case, the
lack of a formal and more rigid
structure seemed to serve the
integration process well. However, this
more flexible approach has also a cost
for the integration process. Some issues
related to it are worth mentioning.
First, a flexible approach lacking
more formal structures to settle
disputes and especially escape clauses to
deal with temporary imbalances in trade
flows seems to work better in the first
years of trade liberalization, when the
core of integration is focused on tariff
reductions. At higher levels of
integration, when more complex
negotiations take place and more is at
stake, a more formal structure with
clear rules seems to be more efficient to
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6 The real gains and losses in
terms of welfare impacts
(measured for example by
equivalent variation) are less
important for a government’s
decision than the perceptions
of gains and losses.
Governments, in general, act
upon their perceptions of
short-term political gains,
which are focused more on
the political cycle than on
long-term economic impacts.
To be sure, Baldwin (1989)
discusses at length the
questions of the political
economy of trade and gives
many examples of second and
third-best policies that
introduce distortions but are
frequently used by
governments.avoid conflicts and maintain the
credibility of the integration process.7
Furthermore, flexible approaches have
not passed the test of crisis and
prolonged recession. For example, as
long as Mercosur economies were
experiencing economic growth and the
exchange rate regimes in Brazil and
Argentina were following similar
patterns, the flexible approach worked
well. As a matter of fact, it was with the
Asian financial crisis and its contagion
effect that resulted in recessions and the
Brazilian devaluation of the real that
problems have intensified. In the
absence of a formal structure to deal
with imbalances in trade flows,
unilateral moves have created tensions
and put into question the credibility of
the integration process and,
consequently, the future of the customs
u n i o na n dc o m m o nm a r k e t .
8_ Harmonization
of macroeconomic policy
The harmonization of macroeconomic
policy is a necessary step in the
direction of a common market.
However, even before the consolidation
of further economic integration, the
process of harmonizing
macroeconomic policies could bring
economic gains and, most important,
add credibility to the integration
scheme. As member countries
implement parameters of
macroeconomic performance – such as
inflation targets and ceilings for budget
deficits, among others – they reduce the
need for strong changes in trade
policies among themselves. Given the
convergence of their economies, even
in the case of an external shock, their
policy responses are likely to be similar,
avoiding extreme, conflicting responses,
which would have the potential of
hurting the credibility of the
integration process.
9_ Setbacks: increasing economic
costs and decreasing
political gains
It has been noted before that frequent
setbacks in the liberalization scheme
bring a loss of credibility to the entire
integration process. It has also been
argued that governments have an
incentive are inclined to used use tariff
and nontariff mechanisms when faced
with trade flow imbalances if the
political gains in the short run are
perceived to be higher than the costs
nova Economia_Belo Horizonte_13 (2)_115-136_julho-dezembro de 2003
Mercosur: past, present, and future 130
7 The most successful
integration processes such
as that of the European Union
and, up to certain degree
that of NAFTA, have more
formal structures and
mechanisms to deal with trade
disequilibrium problems.associated with those actions. Thus, a
natural way to avoid potential setbacks
is to reduce potential gains and/or
increase the costs of such measures.
As for perceived political gains, unless
there is a major change in the economic
perception of the population and
people become free-traders, not much
can be done in that area. However,
there are many routes to increase the
associated costs and thus reduce the
likelihood of frequent setbacks and
their negative impacts on the
integration process credibility.
10_ Going beyond a free trade area
The argument here is quite simple. The
cost associated with setbacks at a lower
level of integration (restricted trade,
free-trade area) is lower than the cost of
setback at a higher level of integration,
such as customs union, common
market or monetary union. The higher
costs would come from stronger
chances of retaliation and more and
deeper disturbances at higher levels of
integration. Consider this extreme
example: a unilateral policy decision to
raise tariffs within a common market
structure could trigger a series of
retaliatory actions that could result in
restricting labor mobility for instance,
or it could even force workers to return
to their home countries. Again, this is
an extreme example to show that very
high potential costs associated with
these types of consequences could act
as a deterrent to the initial policy
response to an economic problem.
Even if a particular government feels it
unlikely that other members of the
scheme would react strongly, the high
costs of such an outcome could result
in avoiding this policy and seeking
alternative, negotiated solutions.
11_ Increasing the depth
of micro integration
Cross-country investments are, at some
level, a consequence of the economic
integration process. As more companies
from one country engage in acquisitions,
joint ventures, and take-overs of
companies in another member country,
the more these countries’ economies will
be integrated at the micro level. The
increased integration of businesses
among member countries solidifies the
linkages between them and increases the
costs of setbacks.
Although there was an increase
in cross-country investments, they do
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a strong deterrence effect on trade
policy setbacks. However, as they
become more prominent, this new
business ownership structure can play
an important role not only in the
short-run increased costs of setbacks,
but also in the long-run integration
scheme, as they would provide more
support for deeper levels of integration.
12_ Increasing the group size:
SAFTA – South American
Free Trade Area,
FTAA – Free Trade Area of
Americas, EU – European Union,
WTO – World Trade
Organization?
The costs associated with adopting
trade-restricting policies for a member
of a trade preferential area are relatively
proportional to the economic size of
the area. For example, a member
country of the WTO would face a
much higher cost in raising protection
barriers unilaterally and outside the
organization’s parameters. The
probability of retaliation or exclusion
from such a large club has a deterrence
effect.8 Similarly, one did not observe
setbacks in NAFTA (North American
Free Trade Agreement) as Mexico slid
into crisis in the 1990s.
Undoubtedly, if it is successfully
negotiated and implemented, a larger
free-trade area will work as a deterrent
to setbacks in the trade liberalization
process. These results should be
expected of a free-trade agreement
negotiated with the rest of South
A m e r i c a ,F T A Ao rE U .B u t ,i ns u c h
cases, what would happen to Mercosur?
Would it disappear as a separate entity?
It certainly would if the bloc did not
consolidate to a level of economic
integration above the free-trade area. As
a free-trade area, Mercosur would make
no sense within a larger free-trade area.
However, if the bloc established a full
customs union and advances into a
common market, it would not be
incompatible with a larger free-trade
area. To be sure, currently, the core
Mercosur nations (Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay) have moved
beyond a free-trade area (as they has
partially adopted a common external
tariff and other features which go
beyond a simple free-trade area
agreement), although they are still
w i t h i nal a r g e rf r e e - t r a d ea r e a( i. e.,t h e
core Mercosur plus the associated
members – Bolivia and Chile).
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8 This does not mean that
WTO member countries do
not raise tariff and nontariff
barriers from time to time.
There are many examples of
that and the WTO has
mechanisms to deal with such
actions. Additionally, any
member country can bring a
case against another member
country as it sees fit. The
argument here is that
countries do not unilaterally
and frequently raise and
reduce barriers to trade that
go against WTO rules as they
w o u l dd oi ft h e yw e r ep a r to f
a small trade area.A South American free-trade
area, FTAA or a Mercosur-EU
free-trade area are likely to improve
credibility of the integration process in
the Southern Hemisphere if Mercosur
can go beyond the free-trade area status
before implementing those larger
agreements. As a matter of fact, if
Mercosur remains cohesive and
negotiates those agreements as a bloc,
the negotiation process per se would
improve the bloc’s credibility as an
important economic integrated area.
The current uncertainty is related
to what path the member countries will
take as WTO and FTAA negotiations
become more difficult. Are they
g o i n gt or e m a i nt o g e t h e rt on e g o t i a t e
as a bloc and, at the same time, deepen
their trade levels and strengthen their
integration at all levels including
infrastructure, etc.? Or will member
countries negotiate bilateral agreements
with other countries and somehow
weaken the bloc as a negotiation tool?
Will Mercosur strengthen its links with
the rest of South America, especially via
infrastructure (transportation, energy,
telecommunications) creating, in this
way, better conditions for further
economic integration?9 There are
many uncertainties, many questions
to be answered, many challenges to be
faced within a historical context of
appealing protectionism due to recent
crisis and setbacks.
13_ Conclusions
Twelve years after it started, Mercosur
has accumulated more success than
failure. However, the frequent setbacks
resulting from domestic and external
shocks have hurt the credibility of the
integration process. Decreasing
credibility can jeopardize the
consolidation of the gains achieved in
the past and seriously block higher
levels of economic integration among
Mercosur members.
It was argued that, in general,
setbacks to integration processes are the
result of a cost-benefit analysis by
governments facing balance of payment
problems. On the benefit side, in the
absence of a complete change in the
economic culture with voters becoming
free-traders, it is difficult to avoid
setbacks as it is difficult to decrease
perceived political gains of raising tariff
and nontariff barriers to trade. On the
cost side, however, there are different
alternatives that can increase the relative
costs of setbacks if they are
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9 For example, between
August 30 and September 1st,
2000 the presidents of all
S o u t hA m e r i c a nc o u n t r i e sm e t
in Brasilia for the first time in
the region’s history.
Additionally, under the
leadership of President Lula,
the region has continued the
dialogue of further integration
in different fronts.implemented and thus contribute to
build credibility and improve the
chances of consolidating and expanding
an economic integration process.
Among others, the negotiation and
implementation of escape clauses to
deal with temporary trade imbalances,
harmonization of macroeconomic
policy so as to converge policy
responses to crisis, achieving higher
levels of economic integration,
increasing the depth of microeconomic
integration, and expanding the size of
the trading bloc are some initiatives that
could improve the chances of success
of an integration process. These types
of initiative may help to consolidate
Mercosur, especially since the current
strong economic uncertainties will
certainly test the political commitment
of Mercosur members to their
integration efforts.
Mercosur members – as other
countries in the world – face the
challenges outlined by Harold James,
the dichotomy between integration
(action) and protectionism (reaction).
Within the global scenario, it is not
clear whether the difficulties of larger
trade negotiations (FTAA, WTO)
would strengthen or weaken the
smaller, regional trade agreements. It is
not clear whether a wave of
protectionism would occur and,
if it does, whether it would be
circumscribed to large, multilateral
trade agreements or include all types
of economic integration. In any case,
the levels of credibility achieved by
Mercosur could make a difference.
If members believe in the long-term
benefits of Mercosur, an orchestrated
effort to increase the credibility of the
agreement must be a priority
if it is to survive.
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